Eric Hobsbawm was born in Alexandria to a middle-class Jewish
family in June 1917. Between the world wars, the family moved
first to Vienna and then to Berlin.
He long retained a memory of himself as a 14-year-old boy who
read on a newspaper board the headline announcing the accession
of the Third Reich. 'Anybody who saw Hitler's rise happen
first-hand could not have helped but be shaped by it,
politically,' he said. 'This is still there in me. That boy is
still somewhere inside, always will be.'
Hobsbawm's parents both died during the Depression and he and
his sister were taken in by his uncle, who worked for a Berlin
branch of a Hollywood, USA, based firm. Soon thereafter, the
family moved to England, following his uncle's job, and for three
years, Hobsbawm experienced what he has rarely felt since - that
history was happening without him. He was bored and dislocated by
the transition from the intensities of pre-war Germany to the
complacencies of a south London grammar school. It was not until
he got to Cambridge that he sensed he could carry on with the
conversations that he'd started in Berlin.
Hobsbawm has defined and explained the progress of the last
century as mankind learning to 'live in expectation of
apocalypse'. He responded to those intimations in himself by
joining the Communist Party. He would, he says, certainly have
become a member earlier, but that his uncle was 'rather stiff' on
the subject. 'He used to say, "You kids don't know what you are
letting yourselves in for".' Hobsbawm smiles now, seeing his life
unspooling in that prophecy. 'He was right, of course.'
You could imagine that the gangling young
émigré, uprooted and orphaned, might have been
attracted to the certainties of the party as a surrogate family
and consequently begin to explain the strength of the attachment
as a powerfully emotional as well as an intellectual one. Looking
back, he suggests that 'probably that kind of security was one of
the appeals', but also that he 'never felt short of family... it
was more that you just felt things were going to pieces, and you
felt it needed a revolution to re-create it, to put it back
together'.
After the war, these political commitments no longer seemed
quite so innocent. Hobsbawm applied for a series of Oxbridge
jobs, and was 'turned down right, left and centre' He fetched up
instead, happily, at Birkbeck where the student body was
part-time, lectures were held in the evenings and the challenge
among the faculty was to keep its audience awake in the graveyard
slot between eight and nine. Hobsbawm, by all accounts, achieved
this effortlessly and sustained his intellectual energy after
hours.
Hobsbawm considered that, given his sympathy for communism, he
got into academia 'under the wire'; a year later, after the
Berlin Airlift in 1948, his story, he believed, would have been
markedly different.
Though he never proselytised unlike many of his comrades,
Hobsbawm did not leave the party after 1956. It may be that
partly because of his political affiliations, he did not get
promotion to a professorship until 1970.
According to Hobsbawm the historian's task, "is not simply to
discover the past but to explain it, and in doing so to provide a
link with the present." For Hobsbawm, history is a cumulative,
collective enterprise to uncover "the patterns and mechanisms"
that have transformed the world.
Historians commonly have diverse viewpoints; indeed,
partisanship or commitment (to Marxism and socialism, in
Hobsbawm's case) this possibly injects new creative energy into
research and prevents the field from turning inward and becoming
ossified.
Hobsbawm's later writings display a general pessimism and
estrangement, arising from his sense of how far humanity had
slipped from the nineteenth century and its expectations of
civility and human progress.
The start of World War I in 1914 (even more than the Russian
Revolution in 1917) represented, in Hobsbawm's estimation, the
great historical turning point separating an age of human
progress from one of increased barbarism.
Reflecting on mankind's trajectory from the Sarajevo of 1914
to the Sarajevo of the fall of Yugoslavia -- total warfare, the
state sanctioned genocides of Nazism and Stalinism, the
annihilatory madness of the Cold War arms race, and the latest
monstrosities -- he declares his unwavering commitment to the
ideas and values of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment as "one
of the few things that stands between us and an accelerated
descent into darkness."
The Enlightenment may not be fashionable ("a conspiracy of
dead white men in periwigs," Hobsbawm jokes) but it is the only
basis, he insists, on which "to build societies fit for all human
beings to live in anywhere on this Earth, and for the assertion
and defence of their human rights as persons." And "the worst of
it is that we have got used to the inhuman. We have learned to
tolerate the intolerable."
This commitment also throws light on the combative, inflexible
tone of his Marxism, now curiously linked to a certain nostalgia
for past civility. If Marxism no longer supplies Hobsbawm with a
political vision, neither is it for him simply a theory of
historical development, the best tool to be found for making
sense of the past. With its positivist values and clear
affirmation of progress in history, Marxism is central to his
moral and cultural critique, linking him firmly to that
"Enlightenment project" dedicated to rationalism and human
improvement.
Whether or not we agree with Hobsbawm's historical judgments
or share his fears for the future, his voice remains loud and
clear.
Marx seemed to him the best guide for understanding the
mechanisms of historical change in the modern world, and he
repeatedly affirms that he has since then discovered no
comparable analytic tool. His analysis of Marxist concepts and
his subtle and flexible use of them in his writing -- abundantly
illustrated in several of these essays -- has been enormously
influential. In this collection, however, the most recent essay
on "Marx and History" dates from 1983 and so it addresses neither
recent critiques nor his personal reactions to the collapse of
the Soviet Union and other recent changes that, in the eyes of
many historians, have diminished the working class as an
historical actor.
As the Communist walls were coming down in 1989, Hobsbawm was
often asked to explain his continued commitment. Typically, he
replied both as a conviction historian - 'I think the movement
has achieved at least one absolutely major thing, and that
includes the Soviet Union, namely the defeat of fascism,' - and
as a rose-tinted loyalist: 'I don't wish to be untrue to my past
or comrades of mine, a lot of them dead, some of them killed by
their own side, whom I've admired [as] models to follow, in their
unselfishness.'
His landmark trilogy on the nineteenth century synthesised
myriad competing social swells into great epochal waves: the Age
of Revolution, the Age of Capital, and the Age of Empire. He has
characterised his own time and tide as the Age of Extremes, the
tempestuous force of which conspired to deposit him on the shore
of the present as the Last Marxist; still, he refuses to believe
himself beached. One old friend observes: 'Eric has long ago
worked out his precise intellectual position and he's quite happy
there, thank you very much.'
These four volumes are probably the most widely admired of his
works -- not simply because of their erudition and bold analysis,
but for the author's conviction that historians must write
large-scale interpretations of the past without minimizing its
diversity and complexity and, at the same time, make them
readable, jargon-free, and accessible to non-professionals. If
more scholars have recently taken up the challenge of historical
synthesis, it is due in no small part to Hobsbawm's
example.
Popular European History pages at Age-of-the-Sage
The preparation of these pages was influenced to some degree by a particular "Philosophy
of History" as suggested by this quote from the famous Essay "History" by Ralph Waldo Emerson:-
There is one mind common to all individual men...
Of the works of this mind history is the record. Its genius is
illustrated by the entire series of days. Man is explicable by
nothing less than all his history. Without hurry, without rest,
the human spirit goes forth from the beginning to embody every
faculty, every thought, every emotion, which belongs to it in
appropriate events. But the thought is always prior to the fact;
all the facts of history preexist in the mind as laws. Each law
in turn is made by circumstances predominant, and the limits of
nature give power to but one at a time. A man is the whole
encyclopaedia of facts. The creation of a thousand forests is in
one acorn, and Egypt, Greece, Rome, Gaul, Britain, America, lie
folded already in the first man. Epoch after epoch, camp,
kingdom, empire, republic, democracy, are merely the application
of his manifold spirit to the manifold world.
- 1 The European Revolution of 1848 begins
- A broad outline of the background to the onset of the turmoils and a consideration of some of the early events.
- 2 The French Revolution of 1848
- A particular focus on France - as the influential Austrian minister Prince Metternich, who sought to encourage the re-establishment of "Order" in the wake of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic turmoils of 1789-1815, said:-"When France sneezes Europe catches a cold".
- 3 The Revolution of 1848 in the German Lands and central Europe
- "Germany" had a movement for a single parliament in 1848 and many central European would-be "nations" attempted
to assert a distinct existence separate from the dynastic sovereignties they had been living under.
- 4 The "Italian" Revolution of 1848
- A "liberal" Papacy after 1846 helps allow the embers of an "Italian" national aspiration to rekindle across the Italian Peninsula.
- 5 The Monarchs recover power 1848-1849
- Some instances of social and political extremism allow previously pro-reform conservative elements to support
the return of traditional authority. Louis Napoleon, (who later became the Emperor Napoleon III), attains to power
in France offering social stability at home but ultimately follows policies productive of dramatic change in the wider European
structure of states and their sovereignty.
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